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Abstract 
This paper looks at the effects of different forms of wholesale and retail regulation on retail 
competition in fixed network telephony markets. We explicitly model two asymmetries 
between the incumbent operator and two entrants: (i) While the incumbent has zero marginal 
costs, the entrant has the wholesale access charge as (positive) marginal costs; (ii) While the 
incumbent is setting a two-part tariff at the retail level (fixed fee and calls price), the entrant 
can only set a linear price for calls. We model the product of the incumbent as horizontally 
differentiated from the products of the entrants who are homogenous and do not have any 
market power. Competition from other infrastructures such as mobile telephony or cable is 
modelled as an „outside opportunity‟ for consumers. We find that entrants without market 
power might be subject to a margin squeeze if the wholesale access price is set at average 
costs and competitive pressure from other infrastructures increases. Product differentiation, 
however, prevents market foreclosure. We argue that a wholesale price regulation at average 
costs is not optimal in such a situation and discuss retail-minus and deregulation as potential 
alternatives. 
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1 Introduction 
In the late 1990s, competition was introduced in European fixed network voice telephony 
markets by allowing entrants to get access to the incumbent‟s network. At the beginning of 
fixed network liberalization, the main concern of regulators was to bring down retail prices 
from their (perceived) excessive levels. As calls prices of the incumbent fell significantly after 
the introduction of wholesale access regulation, the focus of regulation shifted: Currently, a 
main concern of NRAs is that the incumbent might – absent regulation – set the price of call 
services so low that an equally efficient entrant in the downstream segment could not survive 
given the regulated wholesale access charge. Such price setting by the incumbent operator is 
called margin squeeze or price squeeze.  
 
Retail services offered by alternative operators buying essential wholesale inputs (origination 
and termination) from the incumbent are still widely used today (see European Commission 
(2009), Annex 2, Figure 44a). The consumer subscribes to the incumbent‟s network and then 
can choose to make her calls via the incumbent or the entrant. This choice is due to ex ante 
carrier selection (CS) and carrier pre-selection (CPS) obligations imposed on the incumbent 
firm. In turn, direct access competition stemming from infrastructure-based cable or 
unbundling (ULL) operators („intramodal‟) is rather limited to this day as the average 
European incumbent firm is holding by far the highest market share.
1
 In contrast, competitive 
pressure from mobile telephony („intermodal‟) has increased significantly over the past 
years.
2
  
 
                                                 
1
 According to European Commission (2009), Annex 2, Figure 45, 81,4% of EU subscribers were using the 
incumbent for direct access in July 2008. 
2
 See European Commission (2009a), Annex 2, Figure 3, or Schäfer/Schöbel (2006), pp. 6-87, for international 
case studies. 
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Our paper examines in detail the incentives and equilibrium outcomes in a scenario where the 
potentially regulated incumbent faces such service-based (CS/CPS) competition. Given this 
focus, infrastructure-based competition – either intramodal from within the wireline sector or 
intermodal from wireless telephony – enters our model as an important outside opportunity 
for consumers. This provides a feasible way to take into account relevant competitive 
developments in this segment without having to deal simultaneously with complicated 
strategic interactions between a large number of potential players. We use this framework to 
examine i) the conditions under which entrants might be subject to a margin squeeze, and ii) 
the implications and effects of various regulatory options such as wholesale access regulation 
at cost oriented prices or retail-minus and retail regulation of the fixed fee.  
 
We employ a differentiated product Bertrand oligopoly model, which distinguishes between 
the incumbent on one hand and several entrants supplying a homogeneous product on the 
other hand. With this specification the incumbent enjoys market power, but the entrants do 
not. We consider this as a rather realistic scenario on fixed voice telephony markets where 
incumbents (still) benefit from diverse incumbency advantages stemming from, e.g., brand or 
product loyalty, good reputation, consumer inertia or uncertainty about quality of new 
entrants. Price competition among CS and CPS providers on the other hand has become 
particularly intense
3
 and has considerably reduced market power of the entrants. As a 
consequence, there is no role for double marginalization in the model. Furthermore, our 
model differs from previous models in two respects: First, we model a potential difference in 
(perceived) marginal cost between the incumbent and the entrant. While the incumbent is 
assumed to have zero marginal costs per minute, the entrant has the wholesale access charge 
as (potentially) positive and substantial marginal costs. We call this asymmetry between 
incumbent and entrant the „vertical asymmetry‟. Second, the incumbent can set a two-part 
                                                 
3
 See European Commission (2009b), chapter 3-6, for evidence on fixed voice telephony markets.  
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tariff at the retail level (a fixed fee and a price per minute), while the entrant can only set a 
linear price per minute.
4
 We call this the „horizontal asymmetry‟. Both of these asymmetries 
appear important when dealing with the service-based type of competition we focus on.  
 
This paper provides a generalized version of the much simpler and policy orientated 
presentation in Briglauer/Götz/Schwarz (2010) who solely focus on the homogenous product 
case. Apart from Briglauer/Götz/Schwarz (2010) – as far as we are aware – the horizontal and 
the vertical asymmetry have not yet been simultaneously applied in a single model. The 
seminal telecom-models of Armstrong (2002) and Laffont/Rey/Tirole (1998a and 1998b) 
(ALRT) either consider one-way access where the incumbent and the alternative operator are 
setting linear prices at the retail level or consider competition (and interconnection) between 
two operators which can both set one- or two-part tariffs at the retail level. Also in the 
literature on non-price discrimination („sabotage‟, „raising rival´s costs‟ see Economides 
(1998), Sibley/Weisman (1998), Beard/Kaserman/Mayo (2001), Weisman (2003), 
Mandy/Sappington (2007)) incumbent and entrant compete in linear prices at the retail level. 
We show that the extent to which the incumbent is able to extract consumer surplus via a 
fixed fee is decisive for retail per-minute prices and for the terms at which the incumbent is 
willing to provide access. Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001) also consider a model where the 
incumbent operator has wholesale costs of zero but is selling access at a positive price. Both 
firms can set two-part tariffs at the retail level, however. Gans and King (2005) investigate the 
                                                 
4
 Although CS/CPS operators could also set two-part tariffs in principle (where the user then pays a fixed fee in 
addition to the incumbent‟s fixed fee), empirical evidence shows that customers are reluctant to accept such an 
„extra‟ fixed fee, see for instance WAR (2004). This comes along with an increase in consumers‟ demand for 
„one-stop-shopping‟ solutions, see European Commission (2009), Volume 2, Annex 2, pp. 125-128, for the 
European or RTR (2008), pp. 20-21, for the Austrian market situation. In turn, the entrants‟ pricing scheme is 
comparatively realistically represented by simple linear tariffs. Only in a few European countries, an effective 
„wholesale line rental‟ product exists (in addition to CS/CPS) which allows an alternative operator to offer 
access services to consumers without having own infrastructure in place (see Cullen International (2007)). 
Therefore, we focus on the case where only CS/CPS is available since this applies to the majority of countries.  
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„competitive neutrality‟ of access charges and model the „vertical asymmetry‟. They find that 
upstream prices that differ from marginal costs are not competitively neutral in the sense of 
placing integrated and non-integrated firms on an equal basis. They do not allow the 
incumbent to set two-part tariffs, however. Davis and Murphy (2001) analyse competition 
between a firm offering two complementary goods and a firm offering only one of the two 
goods, which is a setting close to the „horizontal asymmetry‟ but without two-part tariffs. 
Peitz (2005) examines the effect of asymmetric access regulation on market entry and 
consumer surplus. Peitz formalizes a market where incumbent and infrastructure-based 
entrants compete in two-part tariffs with identical cost structures. Other (recent) related papers 
are Sarmento/Brandao (2007) and Kotakorpi (2006) which focus on effects of vertical 
integration and access regulation on foreclosure and investments. Both use linear pricing at 
the retail level.  
 
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 
contrasts the benchmark case of an unregulated incumbent with various regulatory options. 
We examine the most commonly employed instruments of retail-minus and cost-oriented 
regulation. We also consider the effects of increased competition from outside opportunities 
and from product differentiation. Section 4 summarizes and discusses the main conclusions. 
 
2 The model 
In this Section we present the model where a vertically integrated operator (the incumbent 
operator I) competes with two (or more) entrants (E1 and E2). Since the entrants basically 
resell the same service (provided by the incumbent), we assume that consumers do not view 
their products as differentiated. Since we assume Bertrand price-competition an immediate 
consequence is that the price of the entrants will always be equal to the access charge t since 
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we assume that all retail costs are zero. As entrants do not exert market power, double 
marginalization is not an issue in our model. Like in Armstrong (2002), our entrants can be 
called a competitive fringe. The entrants buy access at a price t from the incumbent operator. 
At the retail level, the incumbent operator is setting a two-part tariff with a fixed charge f and 
a per-minute charge of pI. The entrants can only set a per-minute charge of pE,1 and pE,2, 
respectively. Consumers subscribe to the incumbent and pay the fixed charge f and then can 
decide whether they use the incumbent or the entrants for their calls.  
 
We model the product of the incumbent as horizontally differentiated from the products the 
entrants offer. While the entrants do not enjoy market power due to selling the same product 
as the fellow entrant, the incumbent has market power and can set a price different from that 
of the entrant and nevertheless command a positive market share. Demand for entrant i is 
given by  
(1) 
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Here we assume that the entrants share demand equally if they charge the same price. The 
incumbent faces retail demand xI for calls with  
(2) 
21 s
spaspa
x EII ,  
where pE = min{pE,1, pE,2}. The differentiation parameter s is between 0 and 1 with 0 
indicating independent demand and 1 indicating that consumers consider the entrants‟ 
products to be perfect substitutes for the product of the incumbent. 
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The above demand functions can be derived from the following quasi-linear utility function of 
a representative consumer:  
(3) 
2
2
,1 ,2
,1 ,2 ,1 ,2( )
2 2
E E I
E E I E E I
x x x
U y a x x x s x x x ,  
where y is the numeraire good. We assume that the number of consumers is of measure one, 
and that all consumers are actually identical. When introducing a fixed fee to extract 
consumer surplus, we will further discuss this assumption.  
With the quasi-linear utility function, consumer surplus is given by (monetary) utility minus 
total expenses. Consumer surplus CS reads 
(4) 
2 2
( )
2 2
E I
E I E I E E I I
x x
CS U Y a x x sx x p x p x f , 
where xE = xE,1 + xE,2 and total income Y is equal to total expenditure from the budget 
constraint and f is the fixed fee (line rental). In formal terms, the latter means that 
E E I Ip x xY y p f  respectively. Consumers will choose to buy access from the 
incumbent only if CS > CS
O
, where CS
O
 is consumer surplus from the outside opportunity, 
which is defined analogously to CS. 
As mentioned in the introduction, CS
O
 provides a simple way to account for infrastructure-
based competition from either intramodal or intermodal services. Note that consumers choose 
either the outside good provided by the alternative suppliers, the incumbent‟s product or 
CS/CPS services provided by the service-based entrants. We will assume that the incumbent 
takes the utility provided by the outside opportunities as given. Therefore, we abstract from 
the potential strategic interactions between the different market segments (e.g. mobile vs. 
wireline).  
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The profit of the entrant i is 
(5) 
, , ,( )E i E i E ix p t , 
while the profit of the incumbent is 
(6) EIII txpxf  
with t being the access charge. For simplification, all other variable costs are assumed to be 
equal to zero. As regards fixed costs, we assume that service-based entry does not require 
fixed investments. Therefore, entrants do not face fixed costs on the retail or wholesale level. 
As we will see later, this implies that foreclose does not occur as long as demand increasing 
effects exists, i.e. as long as s < 1. 
 
3 Equilibrium outcomes under various regulatory 
regimes 
We now turn to the derivation of the equilibrium of the model. Due to the simple setup with 
two homogenous entrants, which do not have market power, the unregulated benchmark case 
as well as the cases with either regulation of only the wholesale access charge or with retail 
regulation of only the fixed fee is straightforward. We discuss these cases briefly and then 
turn to the practically most relevant case of the combination of retail and wholesale regulation.  
 
3.1 Benchmark case 
As noted above, introducing at least two entrants offering a homogeneous product leads to 
pricing at marginal costs for the entrants, i.e., for each entrant we have pE = t. There is no 
double marginalization problem in this case, and the incumbent will simply set the access 
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charge equal to marginal costs, i.e. t = 0. This maximizes the consumer surplus, which the 
incumbent extracts via the fixed fee f
UR
.  
2
1
UR Oaf CS
s
 
The fixed fee is decreasing in the product differentiation parameter s, the more homogenous 
products are, the lower is consumer surplus. 
These results are an instance of the „Chicago Critique‟ of foreclosure according to which there 
is only one profit which the incumbent can fully skim by the fixed fee. If potential entrants are 
equally efficient retail outlets and if they do not have market power, the incumbent is strictly 
better off to provide access as long as s < 1, i.e. if there is a „love of variety‟ effect.5 
The welfare properties of the equilibrium are straightforward. Since prices are equal to 
marginal costs, we are in a first-best solution. Total welfare is at a maximum and consumer 
surplus is equal to the consumer surplus provided by the outside opportunity.  
 
As for the benchmark case, turning to the case of isolated regulation of the wholesale access 
charge t, the result is obvious. Since the unregulated access charge is equal to marginal cost, 
there is nothing to gain in terms of welfare or of consumer surplus with such a policy.  
 
3.2 Retail regulation of the fixed fee f  
So far, we considered cases where the incumbent charged retail prices rather close to marginal 
costs as he could extract consumer surplus directly by means of a fixed fee. In the next step, 
we examine the changes resulting from putting constraints on this instrument. In opposite to 
the outside opportunity such constraints render extraction of all consumer surplus (above CS
O
) 
                                                 
5
 In the model, the incumbent would even „subsidize‟ inefficient entrants or entrants facing fixed costs if 
consumers value variety. However, voluntary access or even subsidized access by an incumbent has, to our 
knowledge, never been observed in practice. We will discuss the assumption of „love of variety‟ in section 4.  
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impossible. In most countries regulators set upper bounds on retail access charges, motivated 
by universal service considerations or firm specific market power.
6
 Second, the ability to 
extract all consumer surplus is limited if consumers are heterogeneous.
7
  
 
We consider the following three-stage game: 
Stage 1: The regulator and/or the heterogeneity among consumers determines f
R
, 
Stage 2: The incumbent sets the access price t 
Stage 3: Price competition between the firms 
 
We have to distinguish three cases:  
Case 1: f
R
 is so small that optimal linear prices are charged. 
Case 2: f
R
 is in a medium range where it becomes binding with equality, such that a marginal 
change in the constraint has an effect on prices.  
Case 3: f
R
 is large and no longer binding. This brings us back to the unregulated benchmark 
case (see above). 
 
Case 1: Optimal linear prices 
If f
R
 is sufficiently small, the incumbent maximizes profits by choosing the optimal linear 
price pI. Taking into account that pE = t, profit maximization with respect to pI yields the 
reaction function, which is also the equilibrium price of the third stage. 
(7) 
1
2
I
a s
p ts . 
                                                 
6
 Prior to liberalisation particular retail access fees were typically cross subsidised due to distributional concerns. 
Introducing liberalisation by forcing access to the incumbent‟s network was first achieved by basic forms of 
wholesale (interconnection) obligations (enabling CPS and CS services). Gradually, inefficient cross subsidies 
among retail tariffs were eliminated („tariff rebalancing‟) during the first liberalisation phase. 
7
 For an in-depth analysis see Tirole (1988), Chap. 3. 
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Substituting this result into the profit function and solving for the equilibrium of the second 
stage of the game, we obtain the access charge t determined by the incumbent as 
(8) 
2
a
t . 
The result is therefore simple and straightforward. Bertrand competition among two entrants 
leads to pE = t and the incumbent sets t as well as pI equal to the monopoly price a/2. By 
setting t equal to this value, the monopolist is able to extract all profit possible with linear 
prices. 
 
Note that the above reasoning applies only if either f
R
 or the utility from the outside good and 
therefore CS
O
 is rather low. It assumes that there is not much substitution away from fixed 
line telephony even if monopoly prices are charged for this service. Given that there are 
serious arguments for considering mobile telephony as increasingly better substitutes for 
wireline services, we expect that the incumbent is subject to stronger constraints. Note that the 
constraints from the outside good and the respective values of CS
O
 imply that Case 2 applies 
also for „small‟ values of fR. As soon as CSO + fR is greater than the consumer surplus with 
optimum linear prices, f
R
 becomes binding with equality. Given the above arguments, we turn 
to the empirically probably more important case 2. 
 
Case 2: f
R
 is binding with equality 
In this case the incumbent sets his price and the access charge in a way such that ensuing 
consumer surplus is just equal to f
R
 + CS
O
. 
(9) 1O RI Ep p t a CS f s     
for 
2 2
,
4 1 1
O R a aCS f
s s
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The boundary cases of the domain lead to the monopoly price and to price equal marginal cost, 
respectively. The explanation of this result is straightforward. The incumbent sets prices 
sufficiently low so that he can extract as much consumer surplus by means of the fixed fee as 
possible and that consumers still buy the product. Given the constraint to provide sufficient 
consumer surplus, the incumbent sets the prices as high as possible since we are in the range 
below the monopoly prices.  
The result in equation (9) shows that there is no margin squeeze; the incumbent offers access 
at retail-minus. Furthermore, prices are decreasing if utility from the outside opportunity 
increases. Via this channel, intermodal competition has a direct effect on call prices. 
Furthermore, the relation between f
R
 and equilibrium prices and the access charge, 
respectively is an inverse one. If the incumbent is allowed to charge a higher fixed fee, he will 
decrease call prices. 
 
3.3 Regulation of the fixed fee f and the access charge t 
In current EU regulatory practice regulation of both the monthly fixed fee and the access 
charge is most common (see Cullen International (2008)). Again, we need to distinguish 
between different, i.e. binding and non-binding levels of f
R
. The wholesale access charge t is 
exogenously fixed by the regulator at a cost-oriented level,
 
t
CO
,
8
 or determined by a „retail-
minus‟ rule, i.e., tRM = pI. In both cases, the entrants‟ price will be equal to the regulated 
access charge. 
 
                                                 
8
 Typically, cost oriented prices are based on average costs of the incumbent‟s network which are significantly 
above marginal costs. For a further discussion on this assumption see Briglauer/Götz/Schwarz (2010), p. 5. 
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First, we consider (exogenously determined) cost oriented access charges. For a low level of 
f
R
 (Case 1) we know that the optimum linear prices apply. The incumbent‟s price derives from 
the respective reaction function (Equation (7) applies). We obtain:  
(10) 1
2
CO
I
a
p s st .  
Note that pI is always greater than t
CO
 as it is a weighted average of the monopoly price and 
the access charge t
CO. Therefore, the incumbent‟s price is greater than that of the entrants and 
there is no margin squeeze.  
 
Next, we examine what happens for larger values of f
R
 + CS
O
, i.e. in the case where f
R
 
becomes binding with equality (Case 2). This applies when f
R
 + CS
O
 is greater than consumer 
surplus evaluated at optimum linear prices, i.e, when 
(11) 
2
25 31
1 , 8 4
2 8 1
R O CO CO CO CO
I E
a sa
f CS CS p s st p t at t
s
. 
If this condition applies, the incumbent will charge a (lower) price in order to guarantee f
R
. As 
soon as  
(12) 
2
,
1
CO
R O CO CO
I E
a t
f CS CS p t p t
s
, 
the incumbent charges a price lower than the price of the entrants and also lower than the 
access charge t
CO
. 
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Figure 1: Equilibrium prices and access charge as a function of f
R
 and CS
O
, including cases with and 
without cost-oriented regulation of wholesale access charge (a = 1, s = .75 ). 
 
Figure 1 depicts both the case without regulation of the wholesale access charge and with a 
rate t
CO
 regulated at average cost. The figure allows for a „dynamic‟ interpretation of a 
development with increasing intermodal competition. Just fix f
R
 at some small values (e.g. .1) 
and assume that CS
O
 is 0 so that optimal linear prices apply (in the case without regulation of 
the wholesale access charge). Without wholesale regulation the incumbent‟s retail and 
wholesale price is equal to the (linear) monopoly price of .5. Increasing intermodal 
competition leading to larger values of CS
O
 eventually leads to a gradual decrease of the 
wholesale and retail prices to prices which can be as low as the marginal costs (which are de 
facto zero on a per minute basis). Finally, we may arrive at flat rates for fixed-line telephony. 
 
If we introduce cost-oriented wholesale regulation of the access charge at t
CO
 = .2, prices are 
lower for low values of CS
O
 than without wholesale regulation. Furthermore, there is no 
margin squeeze and the incumbent charges a higher retail price than the entrant (pI
CO
 > pE
CO
). 
However, as intermodal competition increases to lead to values of f
R
 + CS
O
 greater than 
about .34, the incumbent reduces his retail price. Tougher intermodal competition eventually 
t
CO
 = pE
CO 
pI
CO 
f
R
 + CS
O 
1O RI Ep p t a CS f s
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leads to a margin squeeze. This is an important result since it is a potential explanation for the 
observed shift of regulation from preventing excessive calls prices to preventing „too low‟ 
calls prices which may squeeze the entrants out of the market. This shift has happened within 
the last years when competition from other (in particular mobile) networks also increased 
significantly and the fixed fee also increased. Three results deserve further mentioning: First, 
in the region of the margin squeeze the incumbent charges a lower price than without 
wholesale regulation. The low pI serves to allow full extraction of f
R
. Second, even though the 
entrants charge a higher price than the incumbent, they get positive demand due to product 
differentiation and therefore are not foreclosed. Third, the incumbent would even have an 
incentive to voluntarily reduce access charge below t
CO
 in order to extract additional 
consumer surplus.  
 
Turning to regulation according to the retail-minus rule, the access charges are determined 
from the incumbent‟s optimization problem. A comparison with section 3.2 shows that a 
retail-minus regulation simply replicates the case without wholesale regulation, i.e., the 
incumbent would voluntarily set the access price according to the retail-minus rule. Increases 
in either f
R
 or CS
O
 lead to a reduction of the access charge t
RM
. With retail-minus regulation 
such increases would eventually lead to lower access charges than the values obtained under 
cost-oriented regulation.  
 
4 Summary and conclusions  
We presented a model where two (or more) entrants buy an input from a vertically integrated 
incumbent and compete with the incumbent in prices at the retail level. The model allowed us 
to investigate if or under which conditions the entrants are subject to a margin squeeze and/or 
will be foreclosed by the incumbent. The entrants have the wholesale access price as positive 
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marginal costs while the incumbent has zero marginal costs. In addition, the incumbent can 
set a two-part tariff while the entrants can only set a linear price. Such we were capturing the 
main features of CS/CPS competition in fixed network voice telephony markets where 
entrants typically enjoy no market power vis a vis the incumbent. In turn, the incumbent still 
has market power which is due to diverse “incumbency advantages”. Furthermore, we 
considered the effects from infrastructure based competition (e.g. from mobile or cable 
networks or from ULL operators) by introducing an „outside opportunity‟ for the consumer. 
 
Since the homogenous entrants do not have market power, there is no double marginalization 
and no margin squeeze in the unregulated case. A margin squeeze may still arise, however, if 
the access charge is regulated at (positive) average costs and the retail fixed fee is unregulated 
or regulated and sufficiently large. But, there is no foreclosure as the entrants are 
differentiated from the incumbent. If the fixed fee is regulated and sufficiently small, the 
margin squeeze disappears. With the introduction of an outside opportunity, a dynamic 
interpretation of the model is possible: In a situation where the access price is regulated at 
average costs and the fixed fee is also regulated (and sufficiently small), an increase in the 
utility provided by the outside opportunity or an increase in the fixed fee will lower the retail 
calls price of the incumbent below the access charge. Increased competition from outside 
opportunities may such lead to a margin squeeze. This is an important result since this might 
have happened in many countries over the past years. As pressure from other infrastructures – 
most notably, mobile telephony – became stronger and stronger, the focus of regulation in 
fixed network markets shifted from preventing excessive calls prices to preventing a margin 
squeeze. Our model provides a reasonable explanation for this and shows that the margin 
squeeze might well be the result of increasing (intermodal) competition rather than of 
anticompetitive behaviour. In the model the incumbent would in a certain range voluntarily 
set an access charge below an average cost-oriented price. In such a situation a retail-minus 
 18 
access price would – at least in theory – lead to lower retail prices than a cost-oriented access 
price. Indeed, regulators seem to increasingly consider retail-minus regulation as kind of 
regulatory safeguard,
9
 which guarantees that there is no margin squeeze and that the regulated 
incumbent firm gets necessary downward pricing flexibility in intermodal competition.  
 
Strong pressure from outside opportunities of course puts into question the need for regulation 
in calls markets (including wholesale regulation and the CS/CPS business case) itself. 
Regulators therefore will have to closely examine whether (and for which markets) 
competitive pressure from mobile telephony or other networks is strong enough so that the 
regulation of fixed network voice telephony markets would no longer be necessary at all or 
could be at least partially reduced. Currently, it seems that (European) policy makers and 
regulators do not consider intermodal competition sufficiently established to warrant full 
deregulation of access and retail markets as an option in the medium term.  
 
A second main result of our models refers to the impact product differentiation has on margin 
squeeze and foreclosure on part of the entrants. As we model consumers‟ demand as 
exhibiting „love of variety‟ the entrants are – despite being exposed to a margin squeeze in 
some situations – never foreclosed. Since they bring additional demand, they are valuable for 
the incumbent who can appropriate the additional surplus. The service-based entrants might 
ensure that customers stay on the incumbent‟s platform rather than switching to intermodal 
                                                 
9
 The retail-minus approach has received increasing regulatory attention in recent years. See for instance, the 
discussion within the Independent Regulators Group (IRG), which published principles of implementation and 
best practice regarding the use of retail-minus pricing (IRG (2005)). Since then retail-minus has been applied by 
NRAs for diverse narrowband (“Wholesale Line Rental”) and broadband (“bitstream”, ”naked-DSL”) access 
products. As regards academic literature see for instance Goncalves (2007) discussing the adequacy of retail-
minus as an alternative to cost orientation in determining bitstream access charges or Sarmento/Brandao (2007) 
who show that retail-minus regulation avoids foreclosure and leads to better results than cost-based regulation in 
terms of investment level and consumer surplus. 
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competitors. Additionally, many effects extend also to the limiting case where the entrant is 
not differentiated from the incumbent (see Briglauer/Götz/Schwarz (2010)) although the 
entrant is then always foreclosed if there is a margin squeeze in this setting.  
 
As regards a critical evaluation of our framework, we first need to mention that there exist 
other explanations for the occurrence of a margin squeeze.
10
 However, we consider those 
arguments not very relevant for the situation of service-based competition we described. 
Second, we assumed that the incumbent takes the utility provided by the outside opportunities 
as given. Therefore, we abstract from the potential strategic interactions between the different 
market segments (e.g. mobile vs. wireline). While one could model these interactions in a 
framework building on ALRT or Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001), this task was also beyond the 
scope of our present paper. 
                                                 
10
 See for example the discussion and literature review on dynamic leveraging in Crocioni (2007). 
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Appendix: Regulatory background 
The EU regulatory framework for electronic communications markets
11
 requires NRAs to 
periodically analyse the state of competition on a certain number of markets and impose 
appropriate ex ante remedies in case that an operator is found to have significant market 
power (SMP).
12
 To promote harmonization among Member States, the European Commission 
also published a list of markets which have to be considered by each NRA, the 
„Recommendation on Relevant Markets‟ (see European Commission (2003)). This 
Recommendation originally included the following fixed network voice telephony markets, 
which are the issue of this article (the number of the market corresponds to the number in the 
Recommendation): 
 
Retail level: 
1. Access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for residential customers. 
2. Access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for non-residential customers. 
3. Publicly available local and/or national telephone services provided at a fixed location 
for residential customers. 
4. Publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location for 
residential customers. 
5. Publicly available local and/or national telephone services provided at a fixed location 
for non-residential customers. 
6. Publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location for non-
residential customers. 
                                                 
11
 See Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC and 2002/22/EC, OJ L108, 24.4.2002. 
12
 The concept of SMP is based on the concept of dominance in general competition law (see European 
Commission (2002). 
 21 
Wholesale level: 
8. Call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location. 
9. Call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location. 
10. Transit services in the fixed public telephone network. 
 
While all NRAs found SMP on the retail access markets (markets 1 and 2) and on the 
wholesale markets for origination and termination, a majority also found SMP on some or all 
of the „calls‟ markets (markets 3-6). In many cases, therefore, not only the access to wholesale 
services, but also the prices of the incumbent‟s retail services have been regulated up to now.  
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